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MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS: #METOOAND TIME’S UP-INSPIRED ACTION AGAINST
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Kathleen McCullough*
The rise of the #MeToo movement and Time’s Up campaign has brought
the issue of sexual harassment into the national spotlight. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission filings for sexual harassment claims have
increased 13 percent since the start of the #MeToo movement, and a little
over a year since its creation on January 1, 2018, the Time’s Up Legal
Defense Fund has received 4139 requests for representation in sexual
harassment claims. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
Federal Arbitration Act to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses for
employment claims, including sexual harassment claims—an interpretation
that prohibits employees from pursuing litigation in court. Recently, federal
and state legislation that prohibit mandatory arbitration of sexual
harassment claims have been proposed and enacted. However, the Federal
Arbitration Act generally preempts state actions, and current federal actions
are limited in scope.
This Note examines the Federal Arbitration Act’s enactment and evolution
to its current “super-statute” status that preempts state actions to limit or
prohibit mandatory arbitration. This Note then explores recent federal,
state, and corporate responses to combat mandatory arbitration of sexual
harassment claims. Finally, this Note argues that federal action is necessary
because state action attacking mandatory arbitration, whether directly or
covertly, is likely preempted by federal law. This Note also encourages
alternative options to limit the impact of mandatory arbitration, such as
empowering attorneys general to pursue sexual harassment claims,
encouraging companies to waive mandatory arbitration, and prohibiting
nondisclosure agreements.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2016, Gretchen Carlson, a former Fox News anchor, sued Fox
News CEO Roger Ailes for sexual harassment.1 Carlson filed her claim in
state court despite a mandatory arbitration clause in her employment
contract.2 Carlson’s suit prompted several other women to come forward,
which placed pressure on Fox News and led to Roger Ailes’s eventual
resignation.3 However, as part of the $20 million settlement, Carlson cannot
discuss the approach her lawyers utilized to file her claim and negotiate the
settlement.4
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)5 to require the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses for
employment claims, including sexual harassment claims.6 Mandatory
1. Hope Reese, Gretchen Carlson on How Forced Arbitration Allows Companies
to Protect Harassers, VOX (May 21, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://www.vox.com/conversations/
2018/4/30/17292482/gretchen-carlson-me-too-sexual-harassment-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/FHC2-B8UL].
2. Id.; see also Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Gretchen Carlson of Fox News
Files Harassment Suit Against Roger Ailes, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/business/media/gretchen-carlson-fox-news-rogerailes-sexual-harassment-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/HGH7-2FLF].
3. Reese, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
6. See infra Part I.C.
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arbitration clauses, and the nondisclosure agreements that often accompany
them, allow serial sexual predators to operate for decades before being held
accountable.7 As Carlson herself stated, “Forced arbitration is a sexual
harasser’s best friend: It keeps proceedings secret, findings sealed, and
victims silent.”8
This Note examines the impact of mandatory arbitration on sexual
harassment claims and assesses recent federal and state legislative action to
limit or abolish the FAA. Part I explores the FAA’s enactment and the
Supreme Court’s subsequent arbitration jurisprudence and includes a brief
discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of mandatory arbitration. Part I
also explains the rise of sexual harassment claims due to the #MeToo
movement and Time’s Up campaign. Part II then outlines current federal and
state legislative attempts to prohibit or limit mandatory arbitration for sexual
harassment claims and discusses whether the FAA is likely to preempt each
action. Part II also examines recent corporate initiatives to prohibit
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims.
Part III advocates for the adoption of federal legislation to prohibit
mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment claims. In the absence of federal
action, Part III argues that state legislative efforts should be employed to
pressure both Congress and companies to act. Finally, Part III proposes
alternative solutions for limiting the impact of mandatory arbitration,
including empowering state attorneys general to pursue sexual harassment
claims, encouraging companies to waive mandatory arbitration clauses, and
prohibiting nondisclosure agreements for sexual harassment claims
altogether.
I. THE ENACTMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
To understand the impact of mandatory arbitration on sexual harassment
claims, it is necessary to understand arbitration and the FAA’s rise and
development into a “super-statute.”9 Part I.A defines mandatory arbitration,
explains the scope of such agreements, and explores their benefits and
drawbacks. Part I.B outlines the FAA’s legislative history, which lends
context to the statute’s scope. Part I.C explores the Supreme Court’s
interpretation and expansion of the FAA over the last twenty-eight years.

7. Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of Workplace Sexual Assault,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/legalagreements-sexual-assault-ndas/543252/ [https://perma.cc/3AU3-5AC2].
8. Gretchen Carlson, Gretchen Carlson: The Supreme Court Tried to End #MeToo.
Here’s How We’re Fighting Back., FORTUNE (May 31, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/31/
gretchen-carlson-supreme-court-ruling-arbitration-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/XT8A-3VA9].
9. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216
(2001) (“A super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new normative
or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over time does ‘stick’ in the public culture
such that (3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect
on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute. . . . The law must also
prove robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time . . . .”).
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Finally, Part I.D examines the increase in sexual harassment claims due to
the #MeToo movement and Time’s Up campaign.
A. Mandatory Arbitration: Definition and Scope
In arbitration, an impartial individual—the arbitrator—resolves a conflict
based on the disputing parties’ evidence and arguments.10 The arbitrator
makes a final and often binding decision based on the merits.11 Two main
mechanisms subject employees to mandatory arbitration: (1) agreements
made upon hiring, and (2) company-wide employment policies.12
Arbitration agreements may broadly apply to all employment claims or may
narrowly require arbitration for only specific types of claims.13 When a
dispute is resolved through arbitration, it excludes other forms of
adjudication, such as litigation in court.14
Mandatory arbitration clauses have dramatically increased over the past
twenty-eight years.15 In 1992, only 2 percent of employees in the United
States were subject to mandatory arbitration.16 This figure rose to almost 25
percent by the early 2000s and exceeded 55 percent of employees in 2017.17
An estimated sixty million American employees are now subject to
mandatory arbitration clauses.18
1. The Benefits of Mandatory Arbitration
Mandatory arbitration agreements may benefit both the employer and
employee.19 Without mandatory arbitration, an employer may wait out
smaller claims under the assumption that employees will be unable to pursue

10. Arbitration, A.B.A. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProcesses/arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/R3K
U-2DLU]; see also RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT
IN EMPLOYMENT 3 (1997).
11. Arbitration can be binding or nonbinding. Arbitration, supra note 10. A judge can
enforce a binding arbitration decision, which can only be appealed in very rare circumstances.
Id. See generally United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (holding
arbitration to be final and binding); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (holding that federal
courts may not overrule arbitration decisions even when a court believes that its own
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is more accurate).
12. ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION: ACCESS TO THE COURTS IS NOW BARRED FOR MORE THAN 60 MILLION
AMERICAN WORKERS 5 (2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E5K8-KKCW].
13. BALES, supra note 10, at 3; see also Clauses, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/
clauses [https://perma.cc/Z9H8-54N7] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
14. See BALES, supra note 10, at 4; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
15. See COLVIN, supra note 12, at 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 790 (2008) (arguing that, in practice, mandatory arbitration
agreements are the most sensible arrangement for both employers and employees).

2658

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

such claims in court.20 At the same time, employees are unlikely to
voluntarily arbitrate cases with potentially high jury awards.21 Proponents
of mandatory arbitration argue that “no viable alternative”22 for resolving
workplace disputes exists, especially for low-wage employees who may not
be able to access the court system.23
Arbitration is considered a more accessible forum24 where employees can
successfully represent themselves25 and attorneys can expend less time and
effort.26 Mandatory arbitration can also provide a forum with subject-matter
expertise and can provide confidentiality to employees who do not want to
go through depositions or testify in open court.27
2. The Drawbacks of Mandatory Arbitration
Mandatory arbitration agreements can have major drawbacks for
employees.28 Critics of mandatory arbitration suggest that employees are

20. See id.; see also Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate
over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559,
563–64 (2001).
21. See St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 790; see also Estreicher, supra note 20, at 563–64.
22. St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 810.
23. See id. at 812; see also Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace
Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 118 (2003) (“Employment arbitration needs to be preserved
and improved, not abandoned.”). Proponents of mandatory arbitration argue that “Due
Process Protocols” establish basic fairness standards in mandatory arbitration and that
arbitration is “surprisingly favorable” to employees as compared to court litigation. See
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Arbitration Today: Mid-Life Crisis or New
Golden Age?, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 16–17 (2017); see also Lisa B. Bingham,
Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases, 47
LAB. L.J. 108 (1996). But see KATHERINE V. W. STONE & ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON.
POLICY INST., EPI BRIEFING PAPER NO. 414, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY
ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 17–18 (2015),
https://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XD8D-GPE6]
(“[A]rbitration procedures vary considerably in their degrees of formality, similarity to court
procedures, and amount of due process provided to the participants.”).
24. See St. Antoine, supra note 23, at 15.
25. See id.
26. See St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 792. In arbitration, parties are not required to follow
strict court procedures that may require an attorney, such as the formal rules of evidence. See
STONE & COLVIN, supra note 23, at 17. Even with an attorney, arbitration may be more costeffective because discovery and motions are more limited. Id. Additionally, arbitration may
provide finality sooner than litigation because appeal rights are very limited. Id.; see also
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
27. Helene Wasserman, Unintended Consequences: How Legislative Responses to
#MeToo May Harm Harassment Victims, 32 WESTLAW J. EMP., Feb. 27, 2018, at 1, 1–4.
28. See COLVIN, supra note 12, at 7 (arguing that mandatory arbitration is a growing threat
to workers’ rights). Parties to a mandatory employment arbitration agreement usually do not
have equal bargaining power, which may create a “take-it-or-leave-it” situation. See
Alexander J. S. Colvin, Organizational Primacy: Employment Conflict in a Post-Standard
Contract World, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE STANDARD
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 194, 200 (Katherine V. W. Stone & Harry Arthurs eds., 2013).
Critics of mandatory arbitration argue that the more the public learns about mandatory
arbitration clauses, the more the public believes them to be “unjust and illegitimate.” See
Victor D. Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute Binding
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less likely to prevail in arbitration and, even if they do prevail, often recover
less than they would through litigation.29 Mandatory arbitration may
suppress meritorious claims and limit publicly accessible information due to
nondisclosure agreements, which are often part of arbitration settlements.30
Employers may have a significant advantage in the arbitration process
because they often choose the applicable procedures and select the
arbitrators.31 Employers also have a “repeat player” advantage because they
are familiar with the system and may deal with the same arbitrator multiple
times, which also creates the potential for unconscious bias in their favor.32
Arbitration’s finality and limited right of appeal also increases reliance on
the arbitrator’s neutrality, expertise, and fairness.33
B. Enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act
The debate regarding the benefits and drawbacks of arbitration predates
the enactment of the FAA. American courts originally considered arbitration
agreements illegal and void because they divested the courts of legislatively
provided jurisdiction.34 In the early 1900s, judicial views began to change,
but laws invalidating arbitration agreements remained.35 Dissatisfaction
with this jurisprudence, especially in the commercial context, fostered a
strong movement to change the law.36 In 1921, the American Bar
Association (ABA) Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law
drafted a bill to reverse the common-law rule invalidating the enforcement
of arbitration agreements.37 This bill was introduced in the House and Senate
in 1922 but never became law.38 In 1923, a new bill was introduced,39 and

Arbitration Clauses Are Unjust: Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in the Time
of Vanishing Trials, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2119, 2133 (2017).
29. See COLVIN, supra note 12, at 3. In successful employment cases, federal court
recovery averages approximately $143,497 versus $23,548 in arbitration, and state court
recovery averages approximately $328,008 versus $23,548 in arbitration. See STONE &
COLVIN, supra note 23, at 21.
30. See COLVIN, supra note 12, at 5–6; Michelle Dean, Contracts of Silence, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Winter 2018), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/nda-agreement.php
[https://perma.cc/UR23-LUDV].
See generally Alexander J. S. Colvin, Mandatory
Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71
(2014).
31. COLVIN, supra note 12, at 3.
32. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 23, at 22–23. Repeat players may also have an
advantage due to their ability to lobby for beneficial changes. See id.
33. See id. at 5; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co. 94 U.S. 535, 538 (1876); Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 445, 453 (1874); see also BALES, supra note 10, at 16.
35. BALES, supra note 10, at 16.
36. Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2038 (2011).
37. BALES, supra note 10, at 33.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 37.
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Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act40 (USAA), later
recodified in 1947 as the Federal Arbitration Act.41
The FAA governs the enforcement of arbitration agreements in contracts
involving interstate commerce and maritime transactions.42 Judicial
interpretation of the FAA generally focuses on the enforcement of arbitration
clauses based on § 2 of the statute, which requires parties to any maritime
transaction or transaction involving commerce to settle controversies arising
out of a contract or transaction by arbitration.43 Under § 2, agreements to
submit to arbitration are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”44
Judicial interpretation of the FAA also focuses on § 1’s exception, which
excludes “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”45
The original 1922 draft of the bill did not include the § 1 exception, and
the scope of this exception is the subject of much debate.46 Before the
exception’s introduction, Andrew Furuseth, the leader of the American
Federation of Labor, objected to the bill.47 Furuseth believed that the bill
would force employees to sign arbitration agreements and that arbitrators
would be biased towards employers.48 Furuseth’s objection was noted in a
January 1923 hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.49 The report from this hearing reproduced a letter from
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover to Senator Thomas Sterling, the
Chair of the subcommittee considering the bill.50 Hoover actively supported
the bill and wrote that it should be amended if there were objections to the
inclusion of “workers’ contracts.”51 The amended language Hoover
suggested became the § 1 exception.52 Courts interpreting the FAA often
reference Furuseth’s intent, the Judiciary Committee hearings, and Hoover’s
letter to determine whether a party falls within the exception.53
40. Pub L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16
(2012)).
41. Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16
(2012)).
42. Id.; BALES, supra note 10, at 17.
43. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 1.
46. BALES, supra note 10, at 33–34.
47. Id. at 34. Andrew Furuseth was also the president of the International Seamen’s Union
of America. Id. Courts often consider Congress’s intent to be the same as Furuseth’s when
interpreting the § 1 exception. Id.
48. Id.
49. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of W. H. H. Piatt,
Chairman, ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law).
50. Id. at 14.
51. Letter from Herbert Hoover, Sec’y of Commerce, to Thomas Sterling, U.S. Senate
(Jan. 31, 1923), reprinted in Hearing, supra note 49, at 14.
52. BALES, supra note 10, at 36.
53. See id. at 34, 37.
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C. Creating a Super-Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act in the
Employment Setting
In the 1990s, seventy years after its enactment, the Supreme Court began
to construe the FAA broadly.54 The Supreme Court cases that expanded the
scope of the FAA are generally five-to-four decisions with strong majority
opinions in favor of enforcing arbitration and equally intense dissents.55
1. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: The Transformation
into a Super-Statute Begins
Beginning in 1991, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that
effectively transformed the FAA into a super-statute.56 In a seven-to-two
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,57 the Court expanded
the FAA’s reach and held that an Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA)58 claim could be subject to arbitration.59
In Gilmer, an employee brought a suit in federal court alleging a violation
of the ADEA, and the employer moved to compel arbitration, relying on the
FAA.60 The employee argued that arbitration did not align with the purpose
of the ADEA61 and emphasized the inadequacy of arbitration.62 However,
the Supreme Court held that the claim was subject to mandatory arbitration,63
reasoning that the FAA was adopted to “reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts.”64 The Court dismissed the
employee’s concerns regarding the adequacy of arbitration and stated that
when parties agree to arbitrate a statutory claim they do not “forgo . . .
substantive rights” but merely change the forum.65 The Court held that,
without evidence suggesting that Congress had not intended the FAA to
apply to ADEA claims, mandatory arbitration agreements were

54. Id. at 1.
55. See infra Part I.C.
56. Previous Supreme Court decisions began this process in the business and commercial
contexts. From the 1980s onward, the Court held that statutory claims may be subject to
arbitration under the FAA, including claims arising from the Sherman Act, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, civil provisions of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), and the Securities Act of 1993. See generally, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
57. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
59. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
60. Id. at 23–24.
61. Id. at 27.
62. Id. at 31. The employee in Gilmer also claimed that additional inadequacies of
arbitration included lack of written opinions, limited appellate review, biased panels, lack of
discovery, lack of “broad equitable relief,” and lack of class actions. Id. at 30–33.
63. See id. at 35.
64. Id. at 24.
65. Id. at 26.
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enforceable.66 The Court also emphasized that judicial review of arbitration
clauses must be analyzed with a “healthy regard” for the federal policy
favoring arbitration.67
In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the FAA did not apply
to employment disputes.68 Drawing on legislative history, Stevens argued
that the FAA applied only to commercial disputes, as evidenced by the 1923
Senate hearing.69 In the hearing, the chairman of the ABA committee
responsible for drafting the bill assured senators that the bill was not intended
to “refer[] to labor disputes, at all.”70 The bill was intended to give
commercial businesses the right to arbitrate.71 Stevens asserted that in
applying the FAA to an ADEA claim, the Court “ha[d] effectively rewritten
the statute.”72
The Gilmer Court avoided the issue of whether the § 1 exception language
applied because the issue was not argued in the lower courts and Gilmer’s
arbitration agreement was not part of his employment contract.73
2. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams: Deciding the Exception’s Scope
Ten years after Gilmer, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,74 the Court
squarely addressed the § 1 exception.75 In a five-to-four decision, the Court
limited the employment contract exception to only transportation workers.76
The Court explained that for an exception of the FAA to apply it must be
premised on the language of § 1.77 Based on a textual interpretation,
including application of the ejusdem generis78 canon, the Court held that the
66. Id. This argument ignores the “last-in-time” canon, which states that more current
statutes are granted greater weight than former statutes. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.,
INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 136
(2016).
67. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
68. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 39; see also supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.
70. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearing, supra note 49, at 9
(statement of W. H. H. Piatt, Chairman, ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law)).
71. Id. (describing the right to arbitrate as “the right or the privilege of sitting down and
agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it”).
72. Id. at 43.
73. See id. at 25 n.2 (majority opinion); see also BALES, supra note 10, at 33.
74. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
75. Id. at 109.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 113–15. The employee also argued that the word “transaction” in § 2 applied
only to commercial contracts, as opposed to employment contracts. Id. at 113. The Court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the employee’s interpretation would render the separate
exception in § 1 superfluous. Id.
78. Ejusdem generis is a canon of statutory interpretation that is used to “interpret a
general term to reflect the class of objects reflected in more specific terms accompanying it.”
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 1195 (5th ed. 2014); see also, e.g.,
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 223–25 (2008) (applying the ejusdem generis
canon).
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§ 1 exclusion provision should be read narrowly.79 The Court focused on the
plain meaning of the words in the exception and reasoned that it was
unnecessary to heavily weigh the legislative history.80
The Court acknowledged various amici, including twenty-one state
attorneys general, who objected to a narrow reading of the exception because
it preempted state claims and infringed on states’ rights.81 The Court rejected
this argument and declined to overrule its previous decision, Southland Corp.
v. Keating,82 which held that the FAA preempted state anti-arbitration laws.83
Additionally, the Court gave weight to Congress’s failure to overturn
Southland Corp.84
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens reiterated many points from his
Gilmer dissent85 and argued that the FAA only applied to commercial
arbitration agreements.86 Stevens pointed to legislative history, including
Representative George S. Graham’s floor debate remarks in 1924, to signify
that the bill was understood to apply to “commercial contracts and admiralty
contracts.”87 Stevens understood the § 1 exception to be read broadly—not
creating superfluous text, but instead providing clarification necessary to
eliminate opposition to the bill.88
3. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: Preempting State Law “Obstacles”
to the Federal Arbitration Act
The Court continued to interpret the FAA broadly in AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion.89 In Concepcion, the Court focused on the final phrase of
§ 2, the “saving clause,” which states that arbitration agreements are
invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress,
or unconscionability.”90 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the
saving clause “preserves generally applicable contract defenses” but does not
79. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113–18.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 121–22.
82. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
83. Id. at 15–16; see also Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122–24.
84. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122. The Supreme Court may consider legislative inaction
when interpreting statutes. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 78, at 1202. Under
“[a]cquiescence rules,” when Congress takes no action to overturn or amend a statute in
response to consistent Supreme Court interpretations that it is aware of, those interpretations
are presumed to be correct. See id.; see also, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972)
(analyzing legislative inaction as acquiescence).
85. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
86. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 125 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924)). Stevens also quoted Representative
Ogden L. Mills, who introduced the 1922 bill in the House and stated that the FAA “provides
that where there are commercial contracts and there is disagreement under the contract, the
court can [en]force an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 125 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting
65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924)).
88. Id. at 128. For more information regarding opposition to the bill and the introduction
of an exception by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, see supra notes 46–52 and
accompanying text.
89. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
90. Id. at 339 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
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“preserve state-law rules” that frustrate the intent of the FAA.91 The
overarching purpose of the FAA, as articulated by the Court, was “to ensure
the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”92
The Court reasoned that the California state rule requiring the availability
of class-wide arbitration interfered with arbitration’s “streamlined
proceedings.”93 The FAA preempted the California rule because it was an
“obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives” of the FAA.94
Justice Breyer, dissenting, emphasized that the FAA’s saving clause
permits courts to refuse enforcement of arbitration agreements for the same
reasons a court would invalidate “any contract.”95 Breyer argued that the
California rule would “reinforce, not obstruct,” the purpose of the FAA and
could not be characterized as targeting arbitration because it imposed
equivalent limitations on litigation.96 Breyer also raised a federalism97
argument, specifically that contract defenses are normally decided by the
states and that the saving clause reflected Congress’s intent to retain an
important role for the states.98
4. Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark: Preempting Covert
Hostility to the Federal Arbitration Act
In Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark,99 the Court
emphasized that the FAA preempts state rules that discriminate against
arbitration.100 In a seven-to-one decision,101 the Court followed Concepcion
and held that the Kentucky Supreme Court had improperly singled out

91. See id. at 343. The Court held that the FAA preempts states from conditioning the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration
procedures. See id. at 340. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the California rule
holding arbitration agreements unconscionable met the requirements of the saving clause. See
id. at 341. While Concepcion focused on class-wide arbitration of consumer contracts, the
holding also applies to employment contracts. Id.
92. Id. at 344.
93. Id. at 346–48.
94. Id. at 352. Justice Thomas’s concurrence argues that “[c]ontract defenses unrelated
to the making of the agreement—such as public policy—could not be the basis for declining
to enforce an arbitration clause.” Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
96. Id. at 362–64.
97. “Federalism” here refers to the vertical division of authority between the federal and
state governments. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 3
(4th ed. 2011). Issues regarding the allocation of power between the federal and state
governments often arise when determining whether to narrowly construe congressional
authority or find federal laws unconstitutional for infringing on state sovereignty. Id. at 240.
98. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 367 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer concluded by stating that
the Court did “not honor federalist principles.” Id.
99. 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017).
100. Id. at 1426.
101. In a short dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the FAA should not apply to
proceedings in state courts. Id. at 1429–30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment and therefore violated the
FAA.102
The Court reasoned that the FAA preempts any rule that “covertly”
accomplishes discrimination against arbitration by disfavoring contracts that
have “defining features” of arbitration agreements.103 Here, the Court found
that the Kentucky Supreme Court had adopted a legal rule “tailor-made” to
apply to arbitration agreements.104
By impeding the ability of “attorney[s]-in-fact” to enter into arbitration
agreements, the Kentucky Supreme Court demonstrated a “hostility to
arbitration”105 and disregarded the FAA’s requirement that courts “place
arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.”106
5. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis: Reinforcing the Super-Statute Status
of the Federal Arbitration Act
The most recent decision to reinforce the broad scope of the FAA was a
consolidated decision rendered in May 2018. In Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis,107 the Court held in a five-to-four decision that neither the FAA’s
saving clause nor the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)108 superseded
Congress’s intent in the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements.109
The Court rejected the employees’ argument that the NLRA’s protection
of concerted labor activities110 overrides the enforcement of individualized
arbitration agreements.111 The Court reasoned that § 7 of the NLRA does
not express approval or disapproval of arbitration and “does not even hint at
a wish to displace” the FAA.112 The Court upheld the validity of
individualized arbitration agreements given the amount of “strong[]”
precedent and the absence of congressional action.113
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg referred to the Court’s decision as
“egregiously wrong.”114 Ginsburg reviewed the FAA’s history, arguing that

102. Id. at 1425 (majority opinion).
103. Id. at 1426.
104. Id. at 1427.
105. Id. at 1427–28.
106. Id. at 1424 (quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 465 (2015)).
107. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
109. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1622, 1632.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees workers “the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Id.
111. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1624.
112. Id. Once again, the majority opinion ignores the canon that statutes enacted later in
time control. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at 136.
113. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1628. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that the
saving clause does not apply to nonenforcement of a contract on public policy grounds. Id. at
1633 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a similar concurrence in Concepcion.
See supra note 94.
114. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the FAA does not require suppression of workers’ collective-action rights.115
Referencing the remarks of Representative Graham and Senator Thomas J.
Walsh before the USAA’s enactment,116 Ginsburg stressed that Congress
intended the USAA to apply to “voluntary, negotiated agreements” and that
the Court’s “exorbitant application of the FAA” stretched the statute far
beyond the contractual disputes it was intended to govern.117
Ginsburg’s dissent also argued that invalidating mandatory arbitration here
did not overrule precedential cases like Concepcion and Kindred Nursing
because the NLRA does not discriminate against arbitration on its face or by
“covert operation[s].”118 Ginsburg also argued that the FAA and NLRA
could be read harmoniously.119
Over the last twenty-eight years, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
FAA has broadly increased its scope and replaced judicial access with
arbitration for an estimated sixty million Americans.120 The FAA, as
construed by the Supreme Court, requires arbitration of statutory claims that
were created decades after the FAA was passed, such as claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)121 and the ADEA.122 Sexual
harassment claims fall under Title VII, meaning that arbitration agreements
are enforced for sexual harassment claims.123
D. The Impact of the #MeToo Movement and Time’s Up Campaign
on Sexual Harassment Claims
The #MeToo movement and Time’s Up campaign brought the widespread
issue of sexual harassment into the national spotlight in late 2017.124 Under
115. See id. at 1643.
116. See id.; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125 (2001); Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Senator Walsh’s extended remarks at the 1923 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing: “The
trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really
not [voluntary] things at all. . . . A man says, ‘These are our terms. All right, take it or leave
it.’ Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right
to have his case tried by the court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no
confidence at all.” (quoting Hearing, supra note 49, at 9)); supra note 87 and accompanying
text (describing Representative Graham’s remarks).
117. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1643–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1646.
119. See id. at 1645. The dissent also included information about the increase in
employment arbitration clauses after Gilmer and Circuit City, stating that in 1992 only 2.1
percent of nonunionized companies imposed mandatory arbitration agreements while the
number increased to 53.9 percent in 2017. See id. at 1644.
120. COLVIN, supra note 12, at 2.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
122. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also supra
Part I.C.1 (discussing Gilmer and the Supreme Court’s enforcement of arbitration for an
ADEA claim).
123. Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm [https://perma.cc/USV7-2YGS] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2019).
124. Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain the Difference Between the
2 Movements—and How They’re Alike, TIME (Mar. 22, 2018), http://time.com/5189945/
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Title VII, workplace sexual harassment125 claims are filed as discrimination
claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).126 In
fiscal year 2018,127 the number of sexual harassment claims filed with the
EEOC increased by 13.6 percent compared to fiscal year 2017.128 This
increase can be attributed to the rise of two groundbreaking women’s
empowerment movements aimed at eradicating sexual harassment and sexual
assault: #MeToo and Time’s Up.129
The #MeToo movement was originally inspired by activist Tarana
Burke.130 In 2006, Burke started a nonprofit, with the motto “Me Too,” that
focuses on helping victims of sexual harassment and assault.131 The #MeToo
movement gained national attention after allegations of sexual assault and
harassment by Harvey Weinstein broke in the New York Times.132 In
solidarity with women speaking out against Weinstein, Hollywood actress
Alyssa Milano posted on Twitter asking her followers to reply with “me too”
if they had been sexually assaulted or harassed.133 Within twenty-four hours,
the hashtag “#MeToo” appeared in more than 500,000 tweets and twelve
million Facebook posts.134 The #MeToo movement launched an important

whats-the-difference-between-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements/ [https://perma.cc/26S75CF7].
125. The EEOC defines “sexual harassment” as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature.” Sexual Harassment,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/
sexual_harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/DW4G-GHNS] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
126. RAYMOND F. GREGORY, UNWELCOME AND UNLAWFUL: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 201 (2004). An EEOC investigation of a discrimination charge
generally ends with one of two findings: “for cause” or “no cause.” Id. “For cause” findings
are those where there is reason to believe the employer has engaged in discrimination. Id.
Such findings lead to further investigation and possibly litigation by the EEOC on behalf of
the claimant. Id. A “no cause” finding ends the EEOC’s involvement but leaves the claimant
the option of going to court. Id. Six months after filing a claim, an employee may demand a
right-to-sue notice that the EEOC must issue even if it has concluded the investigation with a
“no cause” finding. Id. at 202.
127. As a federal agency, the EEOC’s fiscal year begins on October 1, ends on September
30, and is designated by the calendar year in which it ends. Glossary Term: Fiscal
Year, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_year.htm
[https://perma.cc/P234-YVQS] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
128. What You Should Know: EEOC Leads the Way in Preventing Workplace Harassment,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
wysk/preventing-workplace-harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/9AGU-7X2K] (last visited
Apr. 10, 2019). For a list of fiscal year 2018 EEOC litigation, see Litigation—FY 2018
Harassment Filings, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/litigation/selected/2018harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/KR6K-XEBH] (last visited
Apr. 10, 2019).
129. See Langone, supra note 124.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Kara Fox & Jan Diehm, #MeToo’s Global Moment: The Anatomy of a Viral
Campaign, CNN (Nov. 9, 2017, 1:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/09/world/metoohashtag-global-movement/index.html [https://perma.cc/5TU9-JBDX]; More Than 12M “Me
Too” Facebook Posts, Comments, Reactions in 24 Hours, CBS NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017,
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discussion regarding sexual harassment and became a global phenomenon.135
Time magazine named “The Silence Breakers” as its 2017 “Person of the
Year,” honoring all of the women and men involved in confronting their
harassers.136
The Time’s Up campaign, announced on January 1, 2018, is an “actionorientated” extension of the #MeToo movement.137 Started by a group of
over 300 women in Hollywood, the Time’s Up campaign focuses on
promoting workplace equality and creating equal economic opportunities for
women and people of color.138 Since its creation, the campaign has raised
$24 million for a legal defense fund to help with legal and media
assistance.139 As of March 1, 2019, the Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund
received 4139 requests for assistance with sexual harassment claims.140
Over a year after the #MeToo movement began, its “undeniable” impact
on the number of reported EEOC sexual harassment claims is still
palpable.141 As #MeToo went viral, traffic to the EEOC website spiked
dramatically, increasing to 66,625 visitors from 30,000 the month before.142
News of sexual harassment claims continues to break, and on September 25,
2018, Bill Cosby’s sentence made him the first #MeToo-era perpetrator to be
sent to prison.143 The widespread impact of the #MeToo movement and
Time’s Up campaign demonstrates the pervasiveness of sexual harassment
throughout the United States and a desire to act in response to this issue.144

6:26 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-more-than-12-million-facebook-postscomments-reactions-24-hours/ [https://perma.cc/PZL7-4GXT].
135. See Fox & Diehm, supra note 134.
136. See Langone, supra note 124.
137. See id.; see also Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-Harassment
Action Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/timesup-hollywood-women-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/T7G9-28A5].
138. See Open Letter from Time’s Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/01/01/arts/02women-letter.html [https://perma.cc/4AHX-ZQVX].
139. TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., https://nwlcciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2019.03.04-Final_nwlc_
TimesUpOneSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SNJ-ANEM] (last updated Mar. 1, 2019).
140. Id.
141. See Nigel Chiwaya, New Data on #MeToo’s First Year Shows ‘Undeniable’ Impact,
NBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-datametoo-s-first-year-shows-undeniable-impact-n918821 [https://perma.cc/7WR7-5X8N].
142. Id.
143. Jenny Jarvie, Led Away in Handcuffs, Bill Cosby Will Serve Three to 10 Years in
Prison for Sexual Assault, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-bill-cosby-sentenced-20180925-story.html [https://perma.cc/W7R3-FK7K]; see
also Anna North, Bill Cosby Is in Prison. But the First Real #MeToo Trial Hasn’t Happened
Yet, VOX (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/1/17902810/bill-cosby-sentencingharvey-weinstein-larry-nassar [https://perma.cc/NNR7-2SDW].
144. This Note focuses on prohibiting mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims.
However, even supporters of legislative change in this area have voiced concerns that a focus
on sexual harassment ignores intersectionality and other forms of discrimination and
employment claims. See, e.g., Terri Gerstein, End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment.
Then Do More., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/
opinion/arbitration-google-facebook-employment.html
[https://perma.cc/5M8P-9FN8].
Workplace violations of different types are often intertwined, and supporters of confronting a
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II. FEDERAL, STATE, AND CORPORATE RESPONSES TO MANDATORY
ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
The national spotlight on sexual harassment has translated into various
attempts to prohibit or limit the application of mandatory arbitration clauses.
This Part addresses federal, state, and corporate responses to mandatory
arbitration of sexual harassment claims. Part II.A discusses federal
responses, including enacted and proposed legislation. Part II.B first
explores enacted state legislation that directly or covertly prohibits
mandatory arbitration and then reviews a state bill that was vetoed because
of anticipated federal preemption. Part II.C discusses recent actions by
corporations prohibiting mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment
claims—some of which have been voluntary and others due to social
pressure.
A. Federal Responses: Enacted and Proposed Legislation
Congress has expressed concern about mandatory arbitration clauses since
the Supreme Court began to expand the scope of the FAA in Gilmer. Within
a few years of the Gilmer decision, the Senate considered legislation that
would have amended the FAA and created exceptions for discrimination
claims.145 This section explores various federal actions that were initiated to
limit the application of the FAA on sexual harassment claims or prohibit
mandatory arbitration in general.
1. The Franken Amendment: Successfully Enacted Federal Legislation
to Limit Mandatory Arbitration
In December 2009, President Obama signed an appropriations bill for the
Department of Defense (DOD), which included the “Franken
Amendment.”146 With the exception of a national-security waiver, this
amendment prohibits providing more than $1 million in federal funding to a
contractor or subcontractor that requires employees to arbitrate claims arising
under Title VII or any tort claims related to, or arising out of, sexual assault
or sexual harassment.147 The Franken Amendment, which received little
public attention, is the first, and only, piece of federal legislation to prevent
employers from requiring mandatory arbitration for their employees.148

broader scope of issues maintain that sexism, racism, and economic exploitation are
“inseparable.” Id.
145. See Protection from Coercive Employment Agreements Act, S. 2012, 103d Cong.
(1994).
146. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123
Stat. 3409, 3454–55 (2009).
147. Id. The Title VII provision includes discrimination claims and allows victims of
assault or rape to sue the individual perpetrator and the perpetrator’s employer. Id.; see also
Sam Stein, Franken’s Anti-Rape Amendment May Be Stripped by Senior Dem, Sources Say,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/
10/22/frankens-anti-rape-amendm_n_329896.html [https://perma.cc/3XA4-QHNY].
148. See Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2010 § 8116, 123 Stat. at 3454–55.
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When he introduced the amendment on the Senate floor, then–Democratic
Senator Al Franken149 stated that his inspiration was the case of Jamie Leigh
Jones, a former employee of defense contractor Kellogg Brown & Root
(KBR).150 Jones alleged that she was gang-raped by coworkers in her
employer-provided housing while working for KBR in Iraq.151 When Jones
attempted to bring a suit against her employer, KBR sought to enforce the
arbitration clause in her employment contract.152 Senator Franken argued
that while arbitration is an “efficient forum” for business disputes, it is not
appropriate for sexual assault and civil rights claims.153 Arbitration,
according to Senator Franken, was inappropriate for these violations because
it has limits—it occurs behind closed doors and therefore the public is not
informed about recurring problems.154 Additionally, an arbitration decision
does not establish precedent for future cases.155
On October 6, 2009, the Senate voted to include the Franken Amendment
in the appropriations bill.156 On the floor, then–Republican Senator Jeff
Sessions, in opposition to the amendment, argued that the Supreme Court had
already resolved that employment arbitration agreements were valid and
“beneficial” in most cases.157 Senator Sessions argued that further methods
for utilizing mediation and arbitration should be explored instead of
eliminating arbitration altogether.158 In support of his argument, Senator
Sessions stated that employees “tend to win” in arbitration as opposed to
litigation.159 Additionally, he listed several advantages of arbitration,
including the advantage, noted by Justice Anthony Kennedy in Circuit City,
that arbitration agreements help parties avoid the high cost of litigation.160
149. Senator Franken resigned in December 2017 when faced with sexual misconduct
allegations of his own. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Yamiche Alcindor & Nicholas Fandos, Al
Franken to Resign from Senate Amid Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/politics/al-franken-senate-sexual-harassment.html
[https://perma.cc/5UH7-AG3R]. For more information on the controversy surrounding
Franken’s resignation, see Laura McGann, The Still-Raging Controversy over Al Franken’s
Resignation, Explained, VOX (May 21, 2018, 6:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/
2018/5/21/17352230/al-franken-accusations-resignation-democrats-leann-tweeden-kirstengillibrand [https://perma.cc/85Y3-N7T8].
150. 155 CONG. REC. 23,403 (2009).
151. Id.
152. Id. Jones was able to bring her suit against KBR following litigation regarding
enforcement of the arbitration provision. But ultimately, the jury found for the defendant
KBR. See Daniel Gilbert, Jury Favors KBR in Iraq Rape Trial, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303365804576434301221391760
[https://perma.cc/W6SX-FV96].
153. 155 CONG. REC. 23,403 (2009).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 155 CONG. REC. 23,562 (2009).
157. 155 CONG. REC. 23,558 (2009); see supra Parts I.A.1–2 (discussing the benefits and
drawbacks of mandatory arbitration).
158. 155 CONG. REC. 23,558 (2009).
159. Id. But see supra note 29 (discussing statistics that suggest employees are less
successful in arbitration).
160. 155 CONG. REC. 23,558 (2009). Senator Sessions also stated that invalidating
employment agreements would violate the due process rights of both employers and
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In response, Senator Franken stressed that the amendment did not seek to
eliminate arbitration completely but would merely eliminate it in cases of
rape or sexual assault.161
Immediately preceding the vote, Senator Franken cited the National
Alliance to End Sexual Violence’s view that it is “outrageous” to ask victims
to enter into arbitration with a perpetrator or with a company that would not
protect them.162 He concluded that victims of sexual assault and
discrimination deserve the “basic right” to pursue “their day in court.”163
Democratic Senator Bill Nelson, a cosponsor of the amendment, also spoke
in support of the bill, noting that the amendment would close a “legal
loophole” that prevented victims from obtaining justice.164
In his final opposing statement, Senator Sessions stated that the DOD
urged him to oppose the amendment.165 Senator Sessions also argued that
the amendment was too broad because it went beyond issues of sexual assault
and rape and eliminated arbitration for any claim under Title VII.166 Despite
Senator Sessions’s opposition, the amendment passed by a vote of sixty-eight
to thirty.167
The Franken Amendment was itself amended during a conference
negotiation between the defense appropriations committees of the House and
Senate.168 The original Senate version did not include the $1 million contract
These changes were
threshold or the national-security waiver.169
incorporated following criticism from the Obama administration’s DOD, the
chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and Senate
Republicans.170 The DOD opposed the amendment and expressed concern

employees and reiterated that employees could benefit from arbitration. Id. at 23,559. Senator
Franken responded that Congress may constitutionally condition the receipt of federal funds
and has imposed conditions in the past to further policy objectives. Id. Franken included a
letter from three prominent constitutional scholars—Akhil Amar, Laurence Tribe, and Erwin
Chemerinsky—in the record, which discussed the constitutionality of the “Franken
Amendment.” Id. Additionally, Senator Franken argued that the amendment supported due
process rights by ensuring that defense contractors could no longer use fine print in contracts
to deny victims “their day in court.” Id. at 23,560.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 23,561.
163. Id. at 23,562.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. The political affiliation for the vote was sixty-eight in favor (fifty-six Democrats,
ten Republicans, and two independent senators) and thirty opposed (all Republicans). Two
senators did not vote. See id.; Roll Call Vote 111th Congress—1st Session, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111
&session=1&vote=00308#position [https://perma.cc/82SR-32H2] (last visited Apr. 10,
2019).
168. See Stein, supra note 147.
169. 155 CONG. REC. 23,402 (2009) (providing the full text of the original Senate version
of the Franken Amendment).
170. See Stein, supra note 147.
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because “[e]nforcement would be problematic.”171 A White House
spokesperson responded that the DOD’s opposition was overstated and that
the Obama administration supported the “intent” of the Franken Amendment
and was working to ensure that it would be enforceable.172 Critics of the
Franken Amendment considered narrowing the scope of included claims.173
However, attempts to remove the Title VII provision were met with public
outcry, which likely helped the provision remain in the final bill.174
The Franken Amendment has been reenacted each year and was included
within the DOD’s $674.4 billion budget for fiscal year 2019.175 However,
the Franken Amendment is limited in scope and does not prohibit a federal
contractor from requiring employees to sign a mandatory arbitration
agreement regarding other claims.176 The legislation also does not cover
race, age, or disability discrimination claims.177
2. The Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order: A Revoked
Attempt to Limit Mandatory Arbitration
On July 31, 2014, President Obama signed Executive Order 13,673, the
“Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces” (FPSW) order.178 This order was a response
to the discovery that federal contracts worth millions of dollars had been
awarded to companies with “rampant” labor law violations.179 The FPSW
order required potential federal contractors and subcontractors to disclose
labor law violations for the past three years.180 Additionally, for contracts
valued over $1 million, the FPSW order prohibited mandatory arbitration for
Title VII and specified tort claims related to, or arising out of, sexual assault

171. Ryan Grim, Defense Department Opposed Franken’s Anti-Rape Amendment,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/
10/19/defense-department-oppose_n_326569.html [https://perma.cc/Z55E-85N3].
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245,
§ 8094, 132 Stat. 2981, 3022 (2018); see also President Signs Defense Package into Law,
Enacts Most On-Time Spending Bills in Two Decades, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/presidentsigns-defense-package-into-law-enacts-most-on-time-spending-bills-in-two-decades
[https://perma.cc/UA8F-37BE].
176. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123
Stat. 3409, 3454–55 (2009).
177. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 23, at 25–26. Wage and hour claims under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and claims based on state employment statutes are also not
included. Id.
178. Exec. Order No. 13,673, 3 C.F.R. 283 (2014).
179. Mary Emily O’Hara, Trump Pulls Back Obama-Era Protections for Women Workers,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017, 6:23 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-pullsback-obama-era-protections-women-workers-n741041 [https://perma.cc/6J6Z-BFU6]. The
Government Accountability Office conducted this investigation in 2010. Id.
180. Exec. Order No. 13,673, 3 C.F.R. 283, 284–85 (2014).

2019]

MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND #METOO

2673

or harassment.181 The Obama administration originally expressed concerns
regarding the Franken Amendment, but the passage of the FPSW order
indicated support for this approach.182
The majority of the FPSW order, and the administrative rule that was
promulgated pursuant to the order, never went into effect.183 A preliminary
injunction partially enjoined the rule and accompanying guidance, including
the prohibition on mandatory arbitration agreements.184 Additionally, on
March 27, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,782, revoking
the FPSW order.185 On the same day, President Trump also signed a
resolution disapproving of the FPSW order’s rule186 under the Congressional
Review Act (CRA).187 The repeal was part of the Trump administration’s
campaign to revoke various Obama administration regulations, characterized
as “overreaching federal rulemaking.”188
Unlike the Franken Amendment, the FPSW order was subject to legal
challenges based on its contradiction of the FAA.189 In October 2016, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that the
FPSW order and rule violated the FAA.190 The district court’s reasoning
mirrored that of a prior Fifth Circuit opinion191: when Congress passes
legislation in an area, such as the FAA, an executive order to the contrary is
181. Id. at 289–90. The FPSW order contained more exceptions than the Franken
Amendment, such as exempting contractors and subcontractors with employees covered under
a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 290.
182. See Grim, supra note 171.
183. See Guidance for Executive Order 13673, “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces,” 82 Fed.
Reg. 51,358 (Nov. 6, 2017) (announcing the rescission of the Department of Labor’s
guidance). On August 25, 2016, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) Council issued a
final rule and the Department of Labor issued guidance based on the FPSW order. 48 C.F.R.
pt. 22.20 (2017).
184. See generally Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV425, 2016 WL 8188655 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016).
185. Exec. Order No. 13,782, 3 C.F.R. 314 (2017).
186. Pub. L. No. 115-11, 131 Stat. 75 (2017). The passage of Public Law 115-11 under
the CRA gives Congress the ability to “fast-track” the reversal of regulations. See Eric Levitz,
Trump Makes Labor-Law Violators Eligible for Federal Contracts Again, N.Y. MAG. (Mar.
27, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/03/trump-lets-federal-contractors-abusetheir-workers-again.html [https://perma.cc/YBP4-P5G7]. The CRA requires a majority in
both the House and Senate to strike down a federal regulation, and a subsequent executive
order cannot reinstate the regulation without congressional approval. See id.
187. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012).
188. Michael Macagnone, Senate Tees Up Repeal of Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Rule,
LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2017, 5:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/897686/senate-tees-uprepeal-of-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-rule [https://perma.cc/H6AA-2XE2]. In June 2018
the Senate and House introduced bills with identical language to the repealed FPSW order
prohibiting mandatory arbitration. See Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Act of 2018, S. 3077,
115th Cong. (2018); Workers’ Freedom to Negotiate Act of 2018, S. 3064, 115th Cong.
(2018); Workers’ Freedom to Negotiate Act of 2018, H.R. 6080, 115th Cong. (2018).
However, no further action occurred after these bills were referred to committee.
189. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 23, at 26.
190. Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 2016 WL
8188655, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2017).
191. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding
that an executive order that conflicted with the NLRA was preempted by the legislation).
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preempted.192 The Obama administration originally appealed the district
court’s injunction, but the case was dismissed following Trump’s
inauguration.193
3. The Arbitration Fairness Act: A Broad Approach
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) is a broad ban on mandatory
arbitration agreements that has taken various forms over the years.194
Generally, the AFA would prohibit mandatory arbitration agreements for
employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights disputes.195 Sexual
harassment claims are included under employment disputes.196
First introduced by Democratic Representative Henry Johnson, Jr. in July
2007,197 the AFA is often reintroduced in response to Supreme Court
decisions regarding arbitration.198 For example, the 2011 AFA was
introduced by Senator Franken and Representative Johnson in response to
Concepcion.199 The 2018 AFA was introduced by Democratic Senator
Richard Blumenthal the day after Epic Systems was decided.200 The 2018
AFA had thirty-two cosponsors in the Senate, but it did not have enough
support to pass within the 115th Congress.201 A House version of the AFA
was also introduced and garnered the support of eighty-two cosponsors.202

192. See Associated Builders & Contractors, 2016 WL 8188655, at *14; see also Reich, 74
F.3d at 1324.
193. See Order of Dismissal at 1, Associated Builders & Contractors, 2016 WL 8188655,
ECF No. 39.
194. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2018, S. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R.
3010, 110th Cong. (2007).
195. See S. 987 § 3. (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no predispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment
dispute, consumer dispute, or civil rights dispute.”).
196. See id.
197. H.R. 3010.
198. See S. 987; see also S. 2591.
199. See Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the Arbitration Fairness Act,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 13, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/concepcionand-the-arbitration-fairness-act/ [https://perma.cc/F3EB-AKY9].
200. S. 2591.
201. See Shane T. Roeber, Supreme Court Upholds Individual Proceedings in Arbitration
Agreements—Hindering Class Actions, NAT’L L. REV. (June 19, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-upholds-individual-proceedingsarbitration-agreements-hindering-class [https://perma.cc/QHV8-8KSQ].
The thirty-two
cosponsors were all either Democratic or independent senators. See S. 2591—Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2018: Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-bill/2591/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/7K5V-C9EN] (last visited Apr. 10,
2019).
202. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017). The eighty-two
cosponsors were all Democrats. See H.R. 1374—Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017:
Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1374/
cosponsors [https://perma.cc/DQU4-VUFT] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
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In February 2019, after Democrats won a majority of seats in the House,203
the renamed Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act, with identical
language to the AFA, garnered 172 cosponsors.204 The FAIR Act was also
introduced in the Senate and garnered thirty-four cosponsors.205
4. The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act:
A Narrow Approach
In December 2017, Democratic Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and
Democratic Representative Cheri Bustos introduced the Ending Forced
Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act.206 This bill is narrower than the AFA
and prohibits pre-dispute arbitration agreements for “sex discrimination
dispute[s].”207 The House version of the bill garnered thirty-eight
cosponsors208 and the Senate version had eighteen cosponsors.209 In contrast
to the AFA, House and Senate sponsorship for the bill did not follow strict
party lines, indicating stronger bipartisan support.210 For example,

203. See Susan Chira & Kate Zernike, Women Lead Parade of Victories to Help Democrats
Win House, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/us/
politics/women-midterms-historic.html [https://perma.cc/7GDN-HWJY].
204. See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R.
1423—FAIR Act:
Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-bill/1423/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/RR5X-FMVA] (last visited Apr. 10,
2019).
205. See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, S. 610, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 610—
FAIR Act: Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/
senate-bill/610/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/Z3LQ-7R5T] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
206. See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act, H.R. 4734, 115th Cong.
(2017); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017).
Senator Gillibrand stated that this bill was inspired by conversations with countless employees
who made it clear that mandatory arbitration clauses were a major impediment to justice for
sexual harassment claims. Janaki Chadha, Gillibrand Calls on Congress to Pass Legislation
on Workplace Sexual Harassment, POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2018, 2:48 PM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/01/26/senator-gillibrand-callson-congress-to-pass-legislation-on-workplace-sexual-harassment-217138 [https://perma.cc/
54EX-VC5P]. On February 28, 2019, this legislation was reintroduced by Representative
Bustos, but it only garnered three cosponsors. See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Harassment Act of 2019, H.R. 1443, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1443—Ending Forced
Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2019:
Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1443/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/
6D66-J4JU] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). However, a related bill that prohibits mandatory
arbitration on a broader scale, the FAIR Act, was introduced in the House on the same day
and received 172 cosponsors. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
207. See H.R. 4734 § 2; S. 2203 § 2.
208. See H.R. 4734—Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017:
Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4734/
cosponsors [https://perma.cc/9Q7J-NR9X] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
209. See S. 2203—Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017:
Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2203/
cosponsors [https://perma.cc/C9PH-JSF2] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
210. The Senate bill had three Republican and fifteen Democratic cosponsors. See id. The
House bill had eight Republican and thirty Democratic cosponsors. See H.R. 4734—Ending
Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017: Cosponsors, supra note 208.
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Republican Senator Lindsey Graham introduced the bill alongside Senator
Gillibrand.211
Initial support for this legislation extended beyond Congress. The
attorneys general212 of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S.
territories sent a letter to Congress in support of the bill.213 The letter called
on Congress to pass “appropriately-tailored legislation” that would ensure
that sexual harassment victims have access to the judicial system.214 This
bipartisan effort, led by Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi (a Republican)
and North Carolina Attorney General Josh Stein (a Democrat),215 represented
the first time in a decade that all fifty-six attorneys general signed a letter to
Congress.216
The letter recognized that arbitration agreements are often buried in “fine
print” and employees often do not understand the effect of mandatory
arbitration until they attempt to bring a sexual harassment claim.217 Further,
the letter stated that secrecy requirements in arbitration “disserve” the
public’s interests.218
Shortly after the letter from the attorneys general, Representative Bustos
wrote an open letter to Paul Ryan, then the Republican Speaker of the House,

211. Jacqueline Thomsen, AGs Demand Congress End Mandatory Arbitration in Sexual
Harassment Cases, HILL (Feb. 13, 2018, 6:33 PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/
administration/373715-all-us-ags-demand-congress-end-mandatory-arbitration-in-sexual
[https://perma.cc/5HSM-PR2P]. Senator Graham stressed that the Ending Forced Arbitration
of Sexual Harassment Act would create incentives to change the workplace to a “less hostile
and more respectful” environment and called on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to endorse
the bill because it was in businesses’ best interest. Press Release, U.S. Senator Lindsey
Graham, Graham, Gillibrand Announce Bipartisan Legislation to Help Prevent Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.lgraham.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/2017/12/graham-gillibrand-announce-bipartisan-legislation-to-helpprevent-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace [https://perma.cc/DT9L-3272].
212. Attorneys general are considered the “top legal officers of their state or territory.”
State
Attorneys
General,
USA.GOV,
https://www.usa.gov/state-attorney-general
[https://perma.cc/3P6F-4Y7P] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
213. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, et al. (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/sign-onletter/Final%20Letter%20-%20NAAG%20Sexual%20Harassment%20Mandatory%20
Arbitration.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU9M-BJCH]; see also Emily Peck, All 50 State AGs
Demand an End to ‘Culture Of Silence’ Surrounding Sexual Harassment, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 13, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/attorneys-general-forcedarbitration_us_5a83484fe4b0cf06751f5abe [https://perma.cc/SG5H-XWHX].
214. See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, et al., supra note 213.
215. See Thomsen, supra note 211; see also Press Release, Att’y Gen. Pam Bondi, Attorney
General Bondi Leads Bipartisan Coalition of All 56 US AGs Urging Congress to Help Protect
Employees from Sexual Harassment (Feb. 12, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/
20180320091135/http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/8EDF0FD736B
B9D8B852582320063232E [https://perma.cc/6W3Z-WLS8].
216. See Thomsen, supra note 211.
217. See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, et al., supra note 213.
218. Id.
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urging him to call for a vote, but no further congressional action occurred.219
This inaction may have been due to quiet lobbying against the legislation by
business leaders who were hesitant to publicly denounce it for fear of
criticism that they were silencing victims of sexual harassment.220
B. State Responses: Covert, Explicit, and Third-Party Action
Thirty-two states introduced bills inspired by #MeToo and Time’s Up in
2017 and 2018.221 Some states explicitly prohibited mandatory arbitration
for sexual harassment claims while others pursued a more “covert” or thirdparty approach. Any prohibition or limitation on mandatory arbitration for
sexual harassment claims remains in effect until a law is challenged in
court.222 The legislative history of these bills indicates an awareness that a
court would likely find that these statutes prohibiting mandatory arbitration
are preempted by the FAA.
1. Washington: A Covert Approach to Limiting Mandatory Arbitration
In 2018, Washington State enacted Senate Bill (SB) 6313,223 which
addresses an employee’s right to file a complaint or cause of action under
Washington or federal antidiscrimination laws.224 The law states that an
“employment contract or agreement is . . . void and unenforceable if it
requires an employee to waive the employee’s right to publicly pursue a
[sexual harassment] cause of action . . . or if it requires an employee to
resolve claims of discrimination in a dispute resolution process that is
confidential.”225 While mandatory arbitration is not explicitly referenced
within the statute’s text, forced arbitration falls squarely under the waiver of
employee rights referenced in the law.
On January 24, 2018, the Washington Senate Labor and Commerce
Committee held a public hearing on three bills regarding sexual harassment
219. See Thomsen, supra note 211; see also Press Release, Cheri Bustos, Open Letter:
Speaker Ryan, You Have the Power to Help End Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (Feb.
28,
2018),
https://bustos.house.gov/open-letter-speaker-ryan-power-help-end-sexualharassment-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/DQ3H-9FX6].
220. Marina Fang, Business Groups Might Be Quietly Killing a Bill That Would Bring
Sexual Abuse Claims to Light, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17, 2018, 4:02 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/forced-arbitration-sexual-harassment_us_5afda846e4
b0a59b4e019e0a [https://perma.cc/7CXW-YYVA].
221. Porter Wells, States Take Up #MeToo Mantle in Year After Weinstein, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.bna.com/states-metoo-mantle-n73014482949/
[https://perma.cc/6TT6-MZJL].
222. See Michael P. Wissa, New York State and City Raise Bar for Employers in Handling
Sexual Harassment Allegations, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/new-york-state-and-city-raise-bar-employers-handling-sexual-harassment-allegations
[https://perma.cc/CRB4-4S47]; see also New York State Passes Significant Sexual
Harassment Legislation, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.sullcrom.com/blogs-new-york-state-passes-significant-sexual-harassmentlegislation [https://perma.cc/T83Q-LXUZ].
223. S. 6313, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (substitute Senate bill).
224. Id.
225. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.085 (2019).
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of employees.226 Discussing these bills, the chair of the committee and the
bill’s sponsor, Democratic Senator Karen Keiser, stated that SB 6313 was the
“thorniest” bill of the three because federal law preempts state regulation of
mandatory arbitration agreements.227 Experts in the field spoke to the
committee, providing support for the bill and discussing concerns that the bill
was preempted and could negatively impact workers subject to other types
of unlawful harassment or discrimination.228
The public hearing on SB 6313 indicates an awareness of the preemption
issue and belief that the bill would withstand a preemption challenge. This
belief is likely unfounded. Waiving the right to publicly pursue a cause of
action is a “defining feature” of arbitration agreements.229 If challenged, this
statute would likely be preempted on the same grounds as the statute at issue
in Kindred Nursing—both statutes disfavor arbitration agreements.230
However, the part of the Washington law that voids agreements requiring
confidentiality for discrimination claims would likely survive a preemption
challenge if severed from the rest of the text.231 Confidentiality is not
required in arbitration, and the FAA is silent on the issue. Even if SB 6313
is invalidated, another newly enacted Washington law prohibits employers
from conditioning employment on an agreement that prevents disclosure of
sexual harassment in the workplace.232
2. New York: An Explicit Approach to Limiting Mandatory Arbitration
On April 12, 2018, Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo signed New
York’s 2018–2019 state budget, which included SB 7507 Part KK,233 a
provision prohibiting arbitration agreements for sexual harassment claims.234
This law defines “prohibited clause[s]” as any provision in an agreement that

226. See Hearing on S. 5996, S. 6313, and S. 6471 Before the S. Labor & Commerce
Comm., 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 24, 2018) (statement of Sen. Keiser) (video and unofficial
transcript available at https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2018011337 [https://perma.cc/
VG7U-KWT9]).
227. Id.
228. Id. These experts included members of the Washington Employment Lawyers
Association and Washington Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs. See id. The bill was
amended in response to these concerns. See SB 6313—2017–18, WASH. ST. LEGISLATURE,
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=6313&Initiative=false&Year=2017
[https://perma.cc/54WQ-LJP7] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). For example, the legislature likely
included the confidentiality provision to address the desire to limit confidential arbitration and
likely removed explicit language regarding sexual harassment claims to avoid negatively
impacting workers subject to other types of discrimination. When SB 6313 was introduced
on January 12, 2018, the original language referenced an “employee’s right to file a complaint
or cause of action arising from sexual harassment or sexual assault.” See S. 6313 § 1, 65th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (original Senate bill) (emphasis added). For more information
about concerns regarding sexual harassment–focused legislation, see supra note 144.
229. See supra Part I.A.
230. See supra Part I.C.4.
231. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.085 (2019).
232. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.210 (2019).
233. S. 7507, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).
234. Id.
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requires mandatory arbitration to resolve sexual harassment claims.235 The
law states, “Except where inconsistent with federal law, . . . prohibited
clause[s] . . . shall be null and void.”236
This provision was not part of the original bill and was added as part of
Governor Cuomo’s “women’s agenda.”237 Floor debate on the amended
version addressed the preemption issue.238 Republican Senator Catharine
Young, then the chair of the Senate Finance Committee, acknowledged that
federal law preempts any state law that treats arbitration less favorably than
other agreements.239 When asked what protections the provision offered,
Senator Young replied that some “extra protections” may exist, but she did
not provide specifics.240 Democratic Senator Liz Krueger, then the ranking
member of the Senate Finance Committee, pointed out that the provision did
“not appear” to provide any new protections.241
The New York law includes the language: “Except where inconsistent
with federal law.”242 This phrase sets the language apart from similar statutes
and, combined with the floor debate, strongly suggests that the legislature
expects preemption.243 New York’s statute explicitly targets mandatory
arbitration and therefore disfavors arbitration.244 This goes against the long
history of Supreme Court cases interpreting the FAA.245 It is possible that,
if challenged, the statute would be upheld for companies operating solely in
New York because intrastate companies are not subject to the FAA.246
However, this would severely limit the provision’s impact.247
The New York law also contains a provision that prohibits nondisclosure
agreements.248 It states that for any claim resolution with a “factual
foundation” involving sexual harassment, “no employer . . . shall have the
authority to include . . . any term or condition that would prevent the
235. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (McKinney 2019).
236. Id.
237. See id.; see also Governor Cuomo Details Legislation to Empower Employees Seeking
Justice for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, N.Y. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.labor.ny.gov/pressreleases/2018/january-30-2018.shtm [https://perma.cc/UC6EA6RH] (stating that the provision would “enhance fairness and protections” for victims of
sexual harassment).
238. N.Y. STATE SENATE, STENOGRAPHIC REC., 241st Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1850–51 (Mar.
30, 2018).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (McKinney 2019).
243. See supra Part II.B.1; see also supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part I.C.4.
245. See supra Part I.C.
246. Devjani H. Mishra & Emily C. Haigh, New York State and City Expand AntiHarassment Requirements for Employers, LITTLER NEWS & ANALYSIS (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/new-york-state-and-city-expand-antiharassment-requirements-employers [https://perma.cc/NE8Q-8QT8]. During floor debate for
SB 7507, Senator Young referenced “opening the door” for lawsuits in state court. N.Y. STATE
SENATE, STENOGRAPHIC REC., 241st Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1856 (Mar. 30, 2018).
247. See Mishra & Haigh, supra note 246.
248. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2019).
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disclosure of the underlying facts and circumstances to the claim or action
unless the condition of confidentiality is the complainant’s preference.”249
This prohibition of nondisclosure agreements applies to all settlements,
agreements, or claim resolutions.250 By prohibiting the nondisclosure of
underlying facts, the bill allows the disclosure of the perpetrator’s identity
while keeping the settlement amount confidential.251
3. California: A Veto in Anticipation of Preemption
The California State Legislature passed Assembly Bill (AB) 3080252 in
August 2018, but it was vetoed by then-Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat,
in September 2018.253 AB 3080 did not explicitly mention mandatory
arbitration, but it prohibited an employee from having to “waive any right,
forum, or procedure for a violation of any provision of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act.”254 Discrimination claims, including sexual
harassment, fall under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.255
Proponents of AB 3080 argued that the bill was “carefully crafted so as not
to run afoul” of Supreme Court precedent.256 A report on the bill from
California’s Office of Senate Floor Analyses specifically referenced
Concepcion and Epic Systems and considered the “lengthy and extensive
history” favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements.257
Governor Brown vetoed AB 3080 because he believed that it “plainly”
violated the FAA.258 His veto message referenced “recent court decisions
that invalidated state policies which unduly impeded arbitration.”259 Quoting
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Ronald L. Burdge, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements Is Bad for Clients, Bad
for Lawyers, Bad for Justice, A.B.A. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012privacyandconfidentialit
y/confidentiality_settlement_agreements_is_bad_clients_lawyers_justice/ [https://perma.cc/
K5S7-ADFH].
252. Assemb. B. 3080, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
253. AB-3080 Employment Discrimination:
History, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB3080
[https://perma.cc/KP7T-SKQB] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
254. Assemb. B. 3080 § 3 (stating that “[a] person shall not, as a condition of employment,
continued employment, the receipt of any employment-related benefit, or as a condition of
entering into a contractual agreement, require any applicant for employment or any employee
to waive any right, forum, or procedure for a violation of any provision of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act . . . including the right to file and pursue a civil action or a
complaint”). The language of AB 3080 resembles the language of Washington SB 6313. See
supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
255. See California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900–
12996 (West 2019).
256. See OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES, THIRD, Assemb. B. 3080, 2017–2018 Reg.
Sess., at 6–7 (Cal. 2018) (concluding that it was a “mischaracterization” to understand AB
3080 as a bill that “prohibits, discriminates against, or discourages arbitration agreements”).
257. See id.; see also supra Parts I.C.3, I.C.5.
258. See Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. to the Members of the Cal. State
Assembly (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AB-3080veto-9.30.pdf [https://perma.cc/RXV2-T2U8].
259. Id.
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Kindred Nursing, Governor Brown stated that a rule “selectively”
invalidating agreements as “improperly formed” is preempted by the FAA,
just like a rule “selectively refusing” to enforce a valid arbitration agreement
is preempted.260 AB 3080 had passed the state assembly by forty-seven votes
to twenty-five and the state senate by twenty-six votes to twelve.261 While
the votes were close to the two-thirds needed to override a veto,262 the lack
of a vote to override the veto likely indicates that the legislature expected
both the governor’s veto and federal preemption.
The same day that Governor Brown vetoed AB 3080, he signed SB 820,
the Stand Together Against Non-Disclosures (STAND) Act,263 which
prohibits nondisclosure agreements for factual information in sexual
harassment cases.264 The STAND Act requires disclosure of a perpetrator’s
identity but does not prohibit nondisclosure agreements regarding the
settlement amount.265 The law applies to claims filed in a civil action or a
complaint filed in an administrative action; any settlements made before
filing such claims are not subject to the same nondisclosure prohibition.266
With a senate vote of thirty to eight and an assembly vote of fifty-six to
nineteen, SB 820 passed with a larger majority than AB 3080.267
Senator Connie Leyva, the bill’s sponsor, argued that nondisclosure
agreements in sexual harassment claims “serve one primary purpose”:
keeping sexual predators out of the public eye.268 Senator Leyva also
stressed that the benefits of nondisclosure agreements were retained under
SB 820 because some victims prefer to keep their identities confidential.269
The governor’s veto of AB 3080 and signing of SB 820 occurred on
September 30, 2018, making these bills some of the first pieces of legislation
to be considered after Epic Systems.270 However, Epic Systems likely had
260. See id. (quoting Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428
(2017)); see also supra Part I.C.4.
261. See AB-3080 Employment Discrimination: Enforcement, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB3080
[https://perma.cc/MGQ6-UHNN] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
262. Legislative Process, CAL. ST. SENATE, https://www.senate.ca.gov/legislativeprocess
[https://perma.cc/66UN-LKJV] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (stating that a two-thirds vote is
necessary in both the assembly and senate to override a veto).
263. S. 820, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
264. Id. SB 820 also prohibits nondisclosure agreements in sexual assault and sex
discrimination cases. Id.
265. Id.; see also Burdge, supra note 251.
266. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (West 2019) (applying to both private and public
employers in California).
267. See SB-820 Settlement Agreements:
Confidentiality, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB820
[https://perma.cc/KHP8-EV44] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); see also supra note 261 and
accompanying text.
268. OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, S. 820, 2017–2018 Reg.
Sess., at 5 (Cal. 2018).
269. Id. at 7. SB 820 grants plaintiffs, but not perpetrators, the option to shield their
identities if they so choose. Id.
270. See AB-3080 Employment Discrimination: Enforcement, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB3080
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little to no impact on the governor’s decisions. SB 820 is not subject to the
FAA because it does not address arbitration,271 and Governor Brown cited
Kindred Nursing, not Epic Systems, to support his veto of AB 3080.272
4. Massachusetts: A Side-Door Approach
As an alternative to prohibiting mandatory arbitration, one state has
proposed legislation to empower the state attorney general’s office to
investigate sexual harassment. In January 2018, Massachusetts proposed
House Bill (HB) 4323273 to enhance investigations into claims of sexual
harassment and discrimination.274 HB 4323 would empower the attorney
general to bring an action on behalf of the state against a person or company
whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that a person or entity is
engaged in sexual harassment and the proceeding would be in the public
interest.275
Supreme Court precedent allows third parties to pursue judicial relief on
behalf of an employee. In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,276 the Supreme Court
held six to three that the EEOC was not prohibited from pursuing a
discrimination claim even though the employee signed an arbitration
agreement.277 The FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies
and does not place restrictions on a nonparty’s choice to pursue a claim.278
The Court reasoned that, while a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
exists, nothing in the FAA authorizes a court to compel arbitration that is not
covered in an agreement.279
In Waffle House, the Court recognized that Congress directed the EEOC,
a public agency, to exercise Title VII enforcement, remedies, and
procedures.280 The Supreme Court allowed the EEOC to pursue the claim,
deferring to Congress’s clear intent that the EEOC be “the master of its own
case.”281 The Massachusetts state legislature, through HB 4323, similarly
empowered the attorney general, in her or his public enforcement capacity,

[https://perma.cc/KP7T-SKQB] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); SB-820 Settlement Agreements:
Confidentiality, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistory
Client.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB820 [https://perma.cc/CPA7-LDYU] (last visited Apr. 10,
2019).
271. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
273. H.R. 4323, 190th Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2018).
274. Id.
275. Id. HB 4323 also empowers the attorney general to join in any action brought by an
individual alleging sexual harassment. Id. On January 19, 2019, the bill was reintroduced and
referred to the Joint Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 3312, 191st Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019).
276. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
277. Id. at 297–98.
278. Id. at 289.
279. Id. The Court held that the “pro-arbitration policy goals of the FAA” did not require
the EEOC to “relinquish its statutory authority” unless an agreement were to require the
agency to relinquish its authority. Id. at 294.
280. Id. at 285.
281. Id. at 291–92.
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to be the “master” of pursuing sexual harassment cases.282 On one hand, if
HB 4323 is passed it may be upheld based on the legislature’s clear intent
and the attorney general’s status as a third party who is unrestricted by the
party’s arbitration agreement.283 On the other hand, the law may be
preempted because state public enforcement agencies may not receive the
same level of deference as the EEOC, a federal agency that was created based
on a clear congressional intent. Overall, a court may uphold the statute due
to federalism concerns about impinging on states’ rights to enforce their own
laws through the attorney general.284
C. Corporate Responses: The Tech Industry Leads the Charge
and the Impact of Social Pressure
With the national spotlight still on sexual harassment claims, companies
are waiving mandatory arbitration clauses for employees.285 Microsoft
became the first Fortune 100 company to publicly endorse the proposed
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act.286 Microsoft also
announced that, instead of waiting for the legislation to pass, any mandatory
arbitration agreements in employee contracts were waived for sexual
harassment claims, effective immediately.287 Microsoft’s endorsement of
the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act exemplifies the
willingness of some companies to proactively prohibit mandatory arbitration
of sexual harassment claims.288 Other companies have followed suit, either
in voluntary support or as a result of employee dissatisfaction and social
282. See H.R. 4323, 190th Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2018).
283. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.
284. This Note addresses federal and state legislative actions to limit the FAA. However,
the FAA has also been challenged in the state court system, such as the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Northern Kentucky Area Development District v. Snyder. No. 2017-SC-000277-DG,
2018 WL 4628143 (Ky. Sept. 27, 2018). The court held that the FAA does not preempt a
Kentucky statute that bars employers from “requir[ing] as a condition or precondition of
employment that any employee . . . waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish any existing or
future claim, right, or benefit.” Id. at *3. Specifically referencing Kindred Nursing, the
Kentucky Supreme Court stated that “[t]he broad preemptive effect of the FAA is undeniable.”
Id. at *4. However, the court “fail[ed] to see how a law . . . that does not actually attack, single
out, or specifically discriminate against arbitration agreements must yield to the FAA.” Id.
The court further clarified that the “statute only proscribes conditioning employment on
agreements to arbitration, not the act of agreeing to arbitration.” Id. A petition for a rehearing
was filed on October 17, 2018. Docket, N. Ky. Area Dev. Dist. v. Snyder, No. 2017-SC000277-DG (Ky. Sept. 27, 2018). If challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court would
likely hold that the FAA preempts the state statute. See supra Part I.C. The Kentucky Supreme
Court is attempting to sever the formation of arbitration agreements from their enforcement,
a distinction the Court explicitly rejected in Kindred Nursing. See supra Part I.C.4.
285. See Luke Norris, Google Employees Are Leading the Way on Sexual Harassment
Reform.
The Rest of the Country Should Follow., SLATE (Nov. 26, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/11/google-walkout-mandatory-arbitration.html
[https://perma.cc/W32W-89TE].
286. Brad Smith, Microsoft Endorses Senate Bill to Address Sexual Harassment,
MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/
microsoft-endorses-senate-bill-address-sexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/VQ27-D4H4].
287. See id.
288. See id.

2684

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

pressure.289 In May 2018, Uber decided to waive mandatory arbitration of
sexual harassment claims after over a dozen women sued the company for
sexual harassment and sexual assault.290 Lyft followed suit, voluntarily
waiving mandatory arbitration clauses and removing confidentiality
requirements for sexual harassment claims.291 In November 2018, Google
announced a mandatory arbitration waiver following a 20,000-employee
walkout protesting the company’s handling of previous sexual misconduct
allegations.292 Facebook, eBay, and Airbnb quickly followed Google’s
lead.293 Airbnb also waived mandatory arbitration for all discrimination
claims, including those involving sexual harassment, race, gender, religion,
or age.294 In February 2019, Google announced that it would no longer
enforce mandatory arbitration provisions for employment disputes with any
employees, including temporary staff, contract workers, and vendors.295
While the tech industry has taken the lead regarding private action, the
pressure to waive mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment claims has
expanded to other industries. Law firms have also been subject to intense
social pressure to remove mandatory arbitration clauses.296 Several law
firms announced that they would remove such clauses for summer associates
289. See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Erin Griffith, Amie Tsang & Kate Conger, Google
Walkout: Employees Stage Protest over Handling of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/technology/google-walkout-sexualharassment.html [https://perma.cc/ML8R-HNJ4]; see also Krista Gmelich, Google Workers
Keep Up Fight on Forced Arbitration After Walkout, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2019, 12:17 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/google-workers-keep-up-fight-onforced-arbitration-after-walkout [https://perma.cc/7WR3-9X3R].
290. See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration for Sexual
Misconduct Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/
technology/uber-sex-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/ZZE3-HEAU].
291. Id.
292. Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Overhauls Sexual Misconduct Policy
After Employee Walkout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/
technology/google-arbitration-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/2JC6-C2MG].
293. See Davey Alba & Caroline O’Donovan, Square, Airbnb, and eBay Just Said They
Would End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Claims, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 15,
2018),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/tech-companies-end-forcedarbitration-airbnb-ebay [https://perma.cc/TX8W-3VBS]; Didi Martinez, Facebook, Airbnb
and eBay Join Google in Ending Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Claims, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-airbnb-ebayjoin-google-ending-forced-arbitration-sexual-harassment-n935451 [https://perma.cc/67WN4LDN].
294. See Alba & O’Donovan, supra note 293.
295. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Ends Forced Arbitration for All Employee Disputes,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/technology/googleforced-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/P35N-SN43]. In February 2019, Google employees
also lobbied Congress to implement changes to limit mandatory arbitration and joined Senator
Blumenthal for the press conference introducing the FAIR Act. Emily Birnbaum, Google
Employees Join Lawmakers Pushing Bills to End Forced Arbitration, HILL (Feb. 28, 2019,
2:14 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/432065-lawmakers-introduce-bills-to-endforced-arbitration [https://perma.cc/AQ73-25YC]. For more discussion of the FAIR Act see
supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.
296. See Angela Morris, Why 3 BigLaw Firms Ended Use of Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses, A.B.A.J. (June 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/biglaw_
mandatory_arbitration_clauses [https://perma.cc/45EN-A45S].
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following a social media campaign criticizing the practice.297 Law students
called on classmates to boycott firms during the recruiting season if the firm
included mandatory arbitration for summer associates.298 Following the
proposed boycott, additional firms removed their mandatory arbitration
clauses, further demonstrating the impact of social pressure in this area.299
III. FEDERAL, STATE, AND THIRD-PARTY OPTIONS TO PROHIBIT
MANDATORY ARBITRATION FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
The Supreme Court’s “predilection for arbitration is unambiguous.”300
The Supreme Court is perceived as increasingly pro-business, and Trumpappointed Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh are expected to
continue this trend.301 Based on the Court’s current makeup, it is unlikely to
limit the reach of the FAA.302 However, as discussed in Part II, proposed
federal and state legislation have targeted mandatory arbitration for sexual
harassment claims.303
This Part argues that immediate action is necessary to restore access to the
judicial system for victims of sexual harassment. Part III.A argues that
federal action is required to prohibit mandatory arbitration for sexual
harassment claims because state actions are likely preempted by the FAA.
Part III.A also argues that despite preemption, states should continue to pass
legislation to increase social pressure on Congress and corporations. Part
III.B explores alternative ways to attack mandatory arbitration for sexual
harassment claims by empowering attorneys general to pursue claims,
encouraging companies to waive mandatory arbitration for sexual
297. Id.
298. Alexia Fernández Campbell, Female Law Students Pressure Firms to Stop Banning
Sexual Harassment Suits, VOX (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/3/18123798/
womens-student-association-mandatory-arbitration [https://perma.cc/KBV9-6EAP].
299. Karen Sloan, Kirkland & Ellis Drops Mandatory Arbitration for Associates amid Law
Student Boycott, LAW.COM (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.law.com/2018/11/21/kirkland-ellisdrops-mandatory-arbitration-for-associates-amid-law-student-boycott/
[https://perma.cc/
FN3C-VXRC]. A list of law firms and their practices regarding sexual harassment claims is
being compiled by Harvard Law School students to increase pressure on firms with mandatory
arbitration
clauses.
See
Coercive
Contracts,
PIPELINE PARITY PROJECT,
http://www.pipelineparityproject.org/coercivecontracts/ [https://perma.cc/ZY9K-2JBK] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2019).
300. Genevieve Hanft, Note, Giving Arbitration Some Credit: The Enforceability of
Arbitration Clauses Under the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761,
2803 (2011); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration,
56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233, 238 (2008) (“At every stage of arbitration’s ascendancy, the Court
has provided the necessary doctrinal pronouncements and political muscle to confirm the gains
achieved and to advance the process to the next level of its reformation.”).
301. See Jeffry Bartash, Trump Set to Make Supreme Court Even More Pro-Business with
Kavanaugh Pick, MARKETWATCH (July 10, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
business-are-winning-big-at-the-supreme-court-a-new-trump-pick-means-theyll-keepwinning-2018-07-09 [https://perma.cc/A3KZ-HU35]; see also Adam Liptak, Corporations
Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/
2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/32ZU-95DP].
302. See supra Part I.C.
303. See supra Part II.
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harassment claims and prohibiting nondisclosure agreements for sexual
harassment settlements, unless requested by the claimant.
A. Federal Action Is Required Because State Action Is Likely Preempted
The rise in EEOC claims and the number of claims filed with the Time’s
Up Defense Fund are strong indicators of the public’s current desire to pursue
claims of sexual harassment.304 Mandatory arbitration results in fewer
claims, with lower chances of success and lower damages.305 Additionally,
dissenting opinions in Supreme Court cases that interpret the FAA provide a
strong argument that the FAA was never meant to apply to employment
contracts.306 However, based on the Supreme Court’s FAA analysis,
mandatory arbitration extends to sexual harassment claims and state action
to the contrary is likely preempted.307 Congress should therefore create a
federal exception to the FAA, either broadly with the FAIR Act308 or
narrowly with the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act.309
Congressional action is not subject to preemption challenges because later
federal statutes control previous statutes. Additionally, public support for the
proposed Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act is evident.
For example, the numerous proposed state statutes prohibiting mandatory
arbitration for sexual harassment claims suggest a strong desire for Congress
to create a sexual harassment exception to the FAA.310 The #MeToo
movement and Time’s Up campaign are not fading away and Congress
cannot ignore the national spotlight on the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment across industries.311 Passing the Ending Forced Arbitration of
Sexual Harassment Act would send a strong message that Congress is
responsive to public concerns about sexual harassment and that arbitration is
not an appropriate forum for such claims.312
Congress should consider expanding the Franken Amendment if the
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act does not receive
enough bipartisan support.313 The Franken Amendment continues to be
reenacted with each annual DOD budget.314 The continued reenactment of
the Franken Amendment shows a bipartisan acceptance of this approach that
could be expanded to other federal budgets and eventually to all government

304. See supra notes 128, 140 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part I.C.
307. See supra Part I.C.
308. See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019); Forced
Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, S. 610, 116th Cong. (2019); see also supra Part II.A.3.
309. See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2019, H.R. 1443, 116th
Cong. (2019); see also supra Part II.A.4.
310. See supra Part II.B.
311. See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Part II.A.4.
313. See supra Part II.A.1.
314. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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contracts.315 Re-legislating the Franken Amendment’s limit on mandatory
arbitration each year is not as impactful or permanent as passing the Ending
Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act, but this approach may be the
only way to maintain bipartisan support.
A step towards expanding the Franken Amendment to all government
contracts could be accomplished by passing the Fair Pay and Safe Work Act
of 2018 (“FPSW Act”).316 Approximately twenty-eight million employees
currently work for federal contractors.317 The proposed FPSW Act would
prohibit mandatory arbitration for new contracts worth more than
$500,000—a lower threshold than the $1 million threshold in the FPSW
order,318 which would increase the number of employees covered by the
prohibition.319
States should also continue to pass legislation that prohibits mandatory
arbitration for sexual harassment claims. Statutes with explicit language,
such as New York’s SB 7507, are almost certain to be preempted by the FAA
if passed and challenged in court.320 However, some protections may still be
offered for employees of intrastate businesses.321 Additionally, each enacted
or publicized statute brings this issue to the public’s attention and increases
pressure on Congress and companies to act.
The proactive state approach of limiting mandatory arbitration for sexual
harassment claims conveys a powerful message to Congress.322
Additionally, state statutes remain valid until challenged in court.323 In the
wake of #MeToo and Time’s Up, employers may be hesitant to challenge
statutes for fear of social backlash.324 Once challenged, the state statutes face
an uphill battle to overcome the argument that they are preempted by the
FAA.325 However, relevant Supreme Court dissents, especially Justice
315. See supra note 175–177 and accompanying text. The DOD budget makes up the
largest portion of the federal budget. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
316. See supra Part II.A.2. The Fair Pay and Safe Work Act of 2018 and the Workers’
Freedom to Negotiate Act of 2018 include the same text regarding mandatory arbitration. See
Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Act of 2018, S. 3077, 115th Cong. (2018); Workers’ Freedom
to Negotiate Act of 2018, S. 3064, 115th Cong. (2018); supra note 188.
317. See Emily Bazelon, Obama Is on a Pro-Labor Roll, SLATE (Aug. 7, 2014),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/08/obama-executive-order-on-mandatoryarbitration-huge-news-for-workers-rights.html [https://perma.cc/KEL4-9DAX].
318. Exec. Order No. 13,673, 3 C.F.R. 283 (2014).
319. See supra Part II.A.2.
320. See supra Part II.B.2.
321. See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.
322. In addition to the examples of Washington and New York discussed above, Maryland,
New Jersey, and Vermont have also enacted legislation prohibiting mandatory arbitration by
prohibiting provisions that waive substantive or procedural rights or remedies for sexual
harassment claims. See Gena B. Usenheimer, Nila Merola, Anne R. Dana & Vlada Feldman,
#MeToo Inspires Legislative Changes Across the United States, SEYFARTH SHAW (Mar. 28,
2019),
https://www.seyfarth.com/publications/MA032819-LE
[https://perma.cc/Z5294B8G]. New Jersey’s legislation is the most expansive and prohibits mandatory arbitration
for any discrimination, retaliation, or harassment claim. See id.
323. See Mishra & Haigh, supra note 246.
324. See Fang, supra note 220.
325. See supra Part I.C.
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Ginsburg’s recent dissent in Epic Systems, lay out a method for interpreting
statutes without conflicting with the FAA.326
B. Alternative Options for Indirectly Attacking Mandatory Arbitration
In the absence of federal legislation, states may still act indirectly to limit
the impact of mandatory arbitration. Such side-door methods focus on
empowering third parties, whether state agencies or companies, to bring
enforcement actions and thus ensure judicial access for sexual harassment
claims.327 Additionally, states should prohibit problematic aspects of
mandatory arbitration, such as nondisclosure agreements. These actions are
not in conflict with the FAA and therefore are not subject to preemption.328
1. Encouraging Third-Party Action: State Attorneys General and
Corporate Empowerment
Third-party action should be encouraged to combat mandatory arbitration
for sexual harassment claims.
By empowering attorneys general to directly pursue sexual harassment
claims, states bypass mandatory arbitration provisions.329 The letter to
Congress signed by all fifty-six attorneys general indicates an overwhelming
interest in limiting mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment claims.330
The empowerment of attorneys general ensures access to the judicial system
for victims of sexual harassment, which the letter describes as “a fundamental
right of all Americans.”331
Massachusetts should pass the pending bill332 to empower its attorney
general, and other states should follow suit.333 Allowing state actors to
pursue sexual harassment claims, despite the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement between the employer and the employee, would begin to limit the
impact of mandatory arbitration agreements.334 Additionally, empowering
attorneys general to pursue sexual harassment claims returns some power to
the states, power the FAA currently restricts with its broad preemption
scope.335
Second, social pressure on corporations should not be underestimated.336
More companies should be encouraged to follow the lead of Microsoft and
Google and waive mandatory arbitration clauses for employee sexual

326. See supra Part I.C.5.
327. See supra Parts II.B.4, II.C.
328. See supra Parts II.B.4, II.C.
329. See supra Part II.B.4.
330. See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, et al., supra note 213.
331. See id.
332. H.R. 3312, 191st Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019).
333. See supra Part II.B.4.
334. See supra Part II.B.4.
335. See supra Part II.B.4; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
336. See supra Part II.C.
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harassment claims.337 Ideally, companies will voluntarily waive these
agreements. However, public pressure has proven effective in this area.338
Google and top law firms changed their practices following social
pressure.339 Additionally, CBS’s board of directors announced in December
2018 that it would deny its ex-CEO $120 million in exit pay after an
investigation into allegations of sexual harassment and assault.340 The board
announced its decision days after information leaked about a $9.5 million
sexual harassment settlement between CBS and Eliza Dushku.341 The CBS
board referenced its investigation as the primary consideration in denying the
exit pay, but the board was likely influenced by public concerns after a year
of sexual harassment allegations.342
2. The State “Side-Door” Approach: Prohibiting
Nondisclosure Agreements
States should enact legislation to prohibit nondisclosure agreements in
settlements related to claims of sexual harassment.
Nondisclosure agreements are criticized for creating a culture of
impunity343 and for being susceptible to misuse by perpetrators to evade
accountability.344 The case of Harvey Weinstein offers a poignant example
of the lasting harm nondisclosure agreements may cause to both victims and
the public.345 Nondisclosure agreements are not subject to the FAA.346
States, therefore, may enact statutes that prohibit the most nefarious
consequences of nondisclosure agreements, while protecting settlement
benefits that sexual harassment victims may desire.347 Some victims of
sexual harassment seek nondisclosure agreements because they believe such
agreements will protect them from unwanted negative attention and
retaliation.348 Additionally, there is a concern that, without nondisclosure
337. See supra Part II.C.
338. See supra Part II.C.
339. See supra Part II.C.
340. Former CBS Boss Les Moonves Denied $120m Exit Pay, BBC (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-46599490 [https://perma.cc/H7W8-LT2C].
341. See Rachel Abrams & John Koblin, CBS Paid the Actress Eliza Dushku $9.5 Million
to Settle Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
12/13/business/media/cbs-bull-weatherly-dushku-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/
QD5G-L9RU].
342. See John Koblin, The Year of Reckoning at CBS: Sexual Harassment Allegations and
Attempts to Cover Them Up, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/
14/business/media/cbs-sexual-harassment-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/V2MA-QXT4].
343. Jia Tolentino, Harvey Weinstein and the Impunity of Powerful Men, NEW YORKER
(Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/harvey-weinstein-andthe-impunity-of-powerful-men [https://perma.cc/PX3V-4XGJ].
344. Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements
[https://perma.cc/M255-9DV7].
345. See id.; see also Hafiz, supra note 7.
346. See supra Part I.B.
347. See supra Parts II.B.1–2.
348. See Wasserman, supra note 27.
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agreements, settlement amounts will decrease.349 States have already
incorporated statutes that address these concerns by allowing both
nondisclosure agreements when requested by the claimant and confidential
settlement amounts.350 Laws that make perpetrators’ names public while
keeping settlement amounts confidential still incentivize employers to settle
and put the public on notice regarding perpetrators’ identities. Current laws
vary in how broadly they prohibit nondisclosure agreements.351 For
example, New York’s statute applies to all settlements, while California’s
only applies to settlements of civil suits.352 To protect the maximum number
of victims, states should follow New York’s lead and use the broadest
enacted statutes as a model for legislation.353
CONCLUSION
In the three months following the outpouring of sexual assault allegations
against Harvey Weinstein, nearly one hundred “powerful people” were
accused of sexual harassment—averaging one person every twenty hours.354
Victims of sexual harassment should have the option to pursue litigation if
they so choose. Arbitration may have benefits within a commercial context,
but the limitations of arbitrating sexual harassment claims are clear.
The public outrage over the enforcement of mandatory arbitration
agreements for sexual harassment claims continues over a year after the
#MeToo movement began.355 However, the Supreme Court is unlikely to
break its twenty-eight-year trend of expanding the scope of the FAA.
Therefore, it is up to Congress to pass legislation to ensure that victims of
sexual harassment receive their day in court. In the absence of congressional
action, states must continue to pass legislation prohibiting mandatory
arbitration of sexual harassment claim in the hope of pressuring Congress
and corporations to act. Finally, as an alternative option, state “side-door”
349. See id.
350. In addition to the examples of Washington, New York, and California discussed
above, Arizona, Maryland, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Vermont have also enacted legislation
prohibiting the use and enforcement of nondisclosure provisions in settlement agreements for
sexual harassment claims. See Wells, supra note 221; see also Maxine Neuhauser, Jeremy M.
Brown & Denise Merna Dadika, New Jersey Responds to the #MeToo Era by Broadly Banning
“Waiver of Rights” and Nondisclosure Provisions in Employment Agreements, NAT’L L. REV.
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-jersey-responds-to-metoo-erabroadly-banning-waiver-rights-and-nondisclosure [https://perma.cc/3J4T-MEBL].
351. See Wells, supra note 221.
352. See supra Parts II.B.2–3.
353. See supra Part II.B.2. On the federal level, a statute prohibiting nondisclosure
agreements should also be passed. The Ending the Monopoly of Power over Workplace
Harassment Through Education and Reporting (EMPOWER) Act is a bipartisan effort to
prohibit NDAs regarding sexual harassment as a condition for employment. S. 2994, 115th
Cong. (2017). The EMPOWER Act was reintroduced in March 2019. EMPOWER Act, H.R.
1521, 116th Cong. (2019); EMPOWER Act, S. 575, 116th Cong. (2019).
354. Swetha Kannan & Priya Krishnakumar, A Powerful Person Has Been Accused of
Misconduct at a Rate of Nearly Once Every 20 Hours Since Weinstein, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 29,
2017), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-sexual-harassment-fallout/ [https://perma.cc/
ZX3S-A2SC].
355. See Gerstein, supra note 144.
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actions can limit the impact of mandatory arbitration provisions on sexual
harassment claims.

